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Abstract
The transition from solitary life to sociality is considered one of the major transitions
in evolution. In primates, this transition is currently not well understood. Traditional
verbal models appear insufficient to unravel the complex interplay of environmental
and demographic factors involved in the evolution of primate sociality, and recent
phylogenetic reconstructions have produced conflicting results. We therefore ana-
lyze a theoretical model for the evolution of female social philopatry that sheds new
light on the question why most primates live in groups. In individual-based simula-
tions, we study the evolution of dispersal strategies of both resident females and
their offspring. The model reveals that social philopatry can evolve through kin selec-
tion, even if retention of offspring is costly in terms of within-group resource compe-
tition and provides no direct benefits. Our model supports the role of predator
avoidance as a selective pressure for group-living in primates, but it also suggests
that a second benefit of group-living, communal resource defense, might be required
to trigger the evolution of sizable groups. Lastly, our model reveals that seemingly
small differences in demographic parameters can have profound effects on primate
social evolution.
K E YWORD S
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1 | INTRODUCTION
The transition from solitary life to sociality is considered one of the
major transitions in evolution (Maynard-Smith & Szathmary, 1995). To
explain the evolution of sociality in primates and the resulting varia-
tion in primate social systems, several verbal models have been devel-
oped over the past decades (Clutton-Brock, 1974; Crook &
Gartlan, 1966; Isbell, 2004; Sterck, Watts, & van Schaik, 1997; van
Schaik, 1989; Wrangham, 1980). Even though some of these models
disagreed over the ultimate causes for the evolution of group-living
(van Schaik, 1989; Wrangham, 1980), they partially built on each
other and eventually resulted in a synthetic model that became known
as the “socioecological model” (Sterck et al., 1997). This model
attempts to explain variation in group size, group composition, and
social relationships among group members in terms of differences in
predation pressure, resource distribution, and infanticide risk. The
socioecological model (hereafter SEM) has constituted the major para-
digm for research on primate social evolution for the past two
decades, but it has recently been subject to severe criticism (Clutton-
Brock & Janson, 2012; Thierry, 2008): perhaps most importantly, it
has been argued that the model fails to explain interspecific variation
in female philopatry (Clutton-Brock & Janson, 2012; Schülke &
Ostner, 2012), a trait which has always been a core element of the
SEM (Sterck et al., 1997) and other models (Isbell, 2004; van
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Schaik, 1989; Wrangham, 1980). Moreover, the SEM has dominated
the field of primatology to such an extent that primatologists have
often neglected alternative accounts to social evolution, both within
and outside the field of primatology. For example, a large body of the-
oretical work suggests that kin selection and habitat saturation play
important roles in the evolution of group formation (e.g., Cadet, Fer-
rière, Metz, & van Baalen, 2003; Cant & Johnstone, 2009;
Emlen, 1982; Giraldeau & Caraco, 1993; Higashi & Yamamura, 1993;
Kokko & Lundberg, 2001; Port, Schülke, & Ostner, 2017;
Taylor, 1988). Likewise, a verbal model of primate social evolution
developed by Isbell (2004) proposed constraints on female dispersal
(usually a consequence of habitat saturation) as a major cause for the
evolution of female sociality. By contrast, according to the SEM, habi-
tat saturation merely affects female social relationships (Sterck
et al., 1997). Lastly, it has been criticized that the SEM relies entirely
on verbal logic, making its assumptions and predictions difficult to test
empirically (Thierry, 2008). This criticism illustrates that the evolution
of primate sociality reflects a complex interplay of diverse environ-
mental and demographic factors that are difficult to disentangle using
verbal reasoning. Some authors have consequently called for a more
rigorous, quantitative approach (Koenig & Borries, 2009). The present
study addresses this need. We develop a comprehensive individual-
based model that “goes back to the roots” of primate socioecology: by
synthesizing core ideas of primate socioecology with theoretical
advances developed outside the field of primatology, we re-examine
the question why most primates live in groups.
Early studies of primate sociality have usually invoked predation
pressure as the ultimate reason for the evolution of group-living in pri-
mates (Alexander, 1974; Clutton-Brock, 1974; Crook & Gartlan, 1966;
Eisenberg, Muckenhirn, & Rudran, 1972). However, in the early 1980s,
Richard Wrangham suggested that communal resource defense rather
than predator avoidance was the most important reason for the evolu-
tion of primate sociality (Wrangham, 1980): according to Wrangham's
resource defense hypothesis, female primates teamed up with other
females, preferentially close kin, to defend communal resource patches
against other (groups of) females. Communal resource defense, there-
fore, led to the evolution of female philopatry, which then constituted
the starting point for the further evolution of primate sociality.
Yet although Wrangham's ideas were certainly intriguing, support for
his theory remained scarce: The resource defense hypothesis was generally
tested on the prediction that, if it was true, and larger groups had a com-
petitive advantage over smaller ones, per capita female reproductive suc-
cess should increase (at least initially) as group size increases. In contrast to
this prediction, the observed relationship between female reproductive suc-
cess and group size was negative in the majority of primate populations
studied (e.g., Jolly et al., 2002; Kappeler & Fichtel, 2012; Robinson, 1988;
Sommer & Rajpurohit, 1989; van Noordwijk & van Schaik, 1999; van
Schaik, 1983), a finding generally interpreted as evidence for within-group
resource competition. The observed pattern seemed to support the tradi-
tional notion that primate groups form for reasons of predator avoidance,
and that within-group feeding competition constrains the evolution of
group size (Terborgh & Janson, 1986; van Schaik, 1983). Thus, although
Wrangham's ideas were considered in later attempts to explain female
social relationships (Sterck et al., 1997; van Schaik, 1989), it soon became
consensus that communal resource defense is not a significant cause for
the evolution of group-living in primates (Schülke & Ostner, 2012;
Terborgh & Janson, 1986; van Schaik, 1983; van Schaik, 1989).
Wrangham's theory was also challenged by a recent phylogenetic
reconstruction of primate social evolution, which proposed a novel,
stepwise scenario for the origins of primate sociality (Shultz, Opie, &
Atkinson, 2011). According to this scenario, sociality first progressed
from solitary foragers into loose aggregations of (unrelated) social for-
agers. The stable and complex societies of most contemporary pri-
mates are then derived from these foraging aggregations after, in a
second step, sex-biased dispersal evolved. Hence, social philopatry is
viewed as a consequence rather than a cause of primate sociality. The
phylogenetic reconstruction of Shultz and colleagues (Shultz
et al., 2011) supports the role of predation in primate social evolution, but
it challenges not only Wrangham's model but also the SEM, which gener-
ally predicts more flexible transitions between the various types of primate
social systems (Shultz et al., 2011). More recent phylogenetic reconstruc-
tions partially refuted the conclusions of Shultz and colleagues by showing
that some of the proposed transitions are not supported by the available
data if a different classification of social systems is used (Kappeler &
Pozzi, 2019; Lukas & Clutton-Brock, 2013). Nevertheless, Shultz et al.'s
study certainly contributed additional uncertainty to the already heated
debate on the evolution of primate sociality.
The apparent limitations of traditional models of primate sociality
(Clutton-Brock & Janson, 2012; Thierry, 2008), together with the
divergent results of phylogenetic reconstructions (Kappeler &
Pozzi, 2019; Lukas & Clutton-Brock, 2013; Shultz et al., 2011) illus-
trate that the origins of primate sociality remain still poorly under-
stood. The present study aims to shed new light onto this question by
quantifying possible selective pressures favoring the transition from a
solitary social organization to sociality. We developed an individual-based
(also known as agent-based) evolutionary model (DeAngelis &
Mooij, 2005), which allows us to examine how selection changes our traits
of interest over the generations and, as a result, the behavior of individuals
and the social organization of the population. This approach enables us to
study possible adaptive causes of primate social evolution more systemati-
cally and quantitatively than would be possible by verbal reasoning.
We focus on a population in which females are initially living soli-
tarily in discrete home ranges. This type of social organization is con-
sidered the ancestral condition in primates and other mammals
(Kappeler & Pozzi, 2019; Lukas & Clutton-Brock, 2013). In addition,
we consider an alternative scenario, in which any female in our popu-
lation is associated with a single male. In this scenario, female social
philopatry evolves from a pair-living social organization, as recently
suggested by Kappeler and Pozzi (2019). Females acquire home
ranges by either finding a vacant home range (an area not inhabited
by another female) or by displacing and established resident female
from her home range (takeover). Group formation may occur via natal
philopatry, but females suffer from within-group competition over
resources, which can be either of the scramble or of the contest type,
or a combination of both (Koenig & Borries, 2002; Terborgh &
Janson, 1986; van Schaik, 1983; van Schaik, 1989). In our model,
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these costs of within-group competition may be compensated by two
possible benefits of sociality. First, sociality may provide primates with
better protection from predators (Alexander, 1974; Crook &
Gartlan, 1966; van Schaik, 1983); second, group-living females may be
more effectively able to defend their communal home range against
other females. This latter assumption incorporates Wrangham's idea
of communal resource defense into our model, though we stress that
it does not strictly reflect the type of between-group competition
envisaged by Wrangham (or the SEM; see Section 4 for details).
We study the evolution of social philopatry based on the evolu-
tion of two behavioral strategies: a (juvenile) female's propensity to
stay in the natal home range and a resident female's propensity to tol-
erate her within her home range. These strategies are assumed to be
heritable traits that evolve as a consequence of mutation, natural
selection, and genetic drift. We start by asking (a) whether social phil-
opatry can evolve if group-living does not provide benefits. Next, we
examine (b) how our proposed benefits (predator avoidance and com-
munal resource defense) affect the evolution of group-living; first, if
these benefits act in isolation from each other, and second, if they
both act together. Finally, (c) we study how variation in demographic
parameters affects group formation and group size.
2 | THE MODEL
2.1 | Model overview
We consider a population structured into m discrete home ranges. These
home ranges are usually referred to “patches” or “territories” theoretical
models of social evolution (e.g., Kokko & Lundberg, 2001; Pen &
Weissing, 2000; Taylor, 1988). They provide sufficient resources to sup-
port one or more individuals. If not indicated otherwise m = 1,000. We
focus on females, which can either be residents occupying a home range
or floaters. Only resident females can reproduce successfully. Floaters can
become residents by either discovering an empty home range (i.e., an area
not inhabited by another female) or by displacing another female from its
home range (takeover). After a successful takeover, the former residents
become floaters. When not evicted by floaters, a female resident remains
in her home range until her death. The present study does not consider
the possibility that floaters peacefully join groups of established residents
(Port et al., 2017). The set of strategies required to incorporate this option
would mean a substantial extension of the present model and is thus
beyond the scope of our study (see Section 4 for details).
Our simulations proceed in discrete time steps. In each time step,
four processes happen in the following sequence:
2.1.1 | Reproduction
Each resident female produces on average F(n,R) offspring, where
n denotes group size and R the female's rank in the group. Concerning
the male contribution to reproduction, we consider two scenarios:
either one male is permanently (until death) associated with all
females in the group (“male residency”), or males are floaters, and each
female mates at random and independently from the other females of
her group with a floating male (“male roaming”).
2.1.2 | Group increase and dispersal
All newly produced males disperse and become floaters. Newly pro-
duced females have an inherited propensity x(n) to stay in the group,
while resident females have an inherited propensity y(n) to accept
juvenile females born within their home range to the group. A juvenile
female will stay in the group with probability x(n)*y(n), where y(n) is
the acceptance propensity of the highest-ranked female in the group.
As indicated by the notation, both propensities depend on group size
n. The propensities x(n) and y(n) are evolvable strategies that change
over the generations subject to mutation, natural selection, and
genetic drift. The population-level group size distribution in the model
results from the individual decisions to stay and to accept juveniles
wanting to stay, and it is therefore an emergent property of the
evolved strategies x(n) and y(n).
2.1.3 | Survival
Female and male floaters survive to the next time step with probabil-
ity SF and SM, respectively. Residents survive with probability SR(n),
which may be dependent on group size n. Home ranges become
empty if all resident females have died.
2.1.4 | Colonization and take-overs
If a female floater discovers an empty home range, she occupies the
home range and becomes the new resident. If a female floater
encounters a home range already occupied by a female (or a group of
females), she attempts a takeover, which is successful with probability
t(n), where n is the female group size in the home range.
For each set of parameters, we run 20–100 replicate simulations
for 2.000 generations. An evolutionary equilibrium was typically
reached after about 1,000 generations.
2.2 | Model details
In this section, we provide details on the rules and functions used to
model processes occurring during each time step of our model. Most
results shown in the main text (Figures 1, 3, and 4) are derived from
the male residency model. Results of the roaming male model are
qualitatively similar, and are presented in online Appendix A. A list of
model parameters, including their default or starting values, is given in
Table 1. At the beginning of our simulations, 90% of home ranges are
inhabited by a single resident female, and the population does not yet
contain female floaters.
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2.2.1 | Reproduction
Owing to density dependent within-group scramble competition, female
fecundity (F) declines as group size increases. Moreover, we allow for con-
test competition leading to reproductive skew among females, such that
higher-ranking females have higher reproductive success than lower-
ranking females. Combining these assumptions, we express the fecundity
(F) of a female of rank R in a group of size n by the function:
F n,Rð Þ= F0 1−φnð ÞR−δ, ð1Þ
where F0 (usually assumed to be 1) is a female's baseline fecundity in
terms of offspring that survive until the dispersal stage, φ gives the
intensity of scramble competition, and δ the intensity of contest com-
petition. According to Equation (1), female fecundity declines as group
size increases, where the magnitude of the decline is given by the
parameter φ. Furthermore, if δ = 0, the effect of density dependence
(scramble competition) is the same for all individuals, but as δ
increases, reproductive success of low-ranking females declines com-
pared to the reproductive success of high ranking females. Equation (1)
reflects key ideas of primate socioecology (scramble and contest com-
petition) and follows the empirical observation that female fecundity
usually declines as group size increases (Jolly et al., 2002; Kappeler &
Fichtel, 2012; Sommer & Rajpurohit, 1989; van Noordwijk & van
Schaik, 1999; van Schaik, 1983). Note, however, that in the male resi-
dency scenario, this formulation (Equation 1) does not account for
possible feeding competition with the resident male. Different types
of function, for example allowing for a humped-shaped relationship
between female reproductive success and group size, yield qualita-
tively similar results (Port, unpublished data).
2.2.2 | Group increase and dispersal
A juvenile female's inherited propensity x to stay in the natal home
range, and a resident female's inherited propensity y to accept (rather
than to evict) her are both conditional on group size (n) and character-
ized by two behavioral reaction norms. We model these reaction
norms as logistic functions:
x nð Þ= 1
1+ exp β0 + β1nð Þ
ð2aÞ
y nð Þ= 1
1+ exp α0 + α1nð Þ ð2bÞ
where x(n) and y(n) are sigmoidal functions that are each characterized
by two (heritable) parameters that determine the shape of the
(a)
(b) (c)
F IGURE 1 The evolution of
primate sociality if group-living
provides no benefits. (a) Evolution of
female group size: mean (solid line) ±
SD (shaded area) of 100 replicate
simulation runs. (b) Distribution of
female group sizes in the final
generation in a representative
simulation. The orange bar represents
home ranges with solitary females,
green bars represent home ranges
with 2 or more females. (c) Evolved
behavioral reaction norms of the
most dominant female (solid line), and
daughters (dashed line). Irrespective
of group size, daughters are always
selected to stay on the natal home
range. In contrast, the propensity of
the most dominant female to tolerate
an additional group member
decreases with group size and
approaches zero for group sizes of
3 and above. Reaction norms are
calculated as means (solid line) ± SD
(shaded area) over 100 simulations.
Simulation parameters: m = 1,000,
F0 = 1, SB = 0.8, Smax = 0.95, SM = 0.8,
SF = 0.6, t0 = 0.05, ε = 0.005, φ = 0.1,
δ = 0.3, σ = 0, τ = 0
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reaction norm. For example, the propensity x(n) to stay in a group of
size n is determined by the parameters β0 and β1. A positive value of
β1 means that the probability to stay declines with group size,
whereas a negative value of β1 means that the probability to stay
increases with group size, and the absolute value of β1 determines the
steepness of the response. The inflection point of the sigmoidal func-
tion x(n) is determined by both β0 and β1 and is located at n = −β0/β1.
Likewise, the reaction norm relating a resident's propensity y(n) to
accept an offspring is determined by two parameters α0 and α1 with a
similar interpretation. x(n) and y(n) can take on values between
0 (disperse/ evict) and 1 (stay/ accept). Group formation occurs when-
ever an offspring decides to stay in the natal home range, and the
established resident(s) decide to accept her, which occurs with proba-
bility x(n)*y(n), where y(n) is the acceptance propensity of the highest
ranking female in the group. New adult group members attain the
lowest rank position, and only increase in rank if a female above them
in the hierarchy dies.
We also considered several model variants. For example, we con-
sidered the scenario that new adult group members do not start their
reproductive career at the lowest rank position, but that they attain
the rank directly below the rank of their mother. Moreover, we
extended the behavioral reaction norms by not only making them
dependent on group size n, but also the mother's rank R. All these
modifications had only a marginal effect on our results (Port, unpubl.
modeling results) and are therefore not pursued further.
2.2.3 | Survival
Group living may have the advantage that individual females face a
lower predation risk, owing to enhanced vigilance, dilution effects,
predator confusion, and/or group defense. We assume that the sur-
vival probability of a resident (male or female) from one time step to
the next in a group of n females is given by:
SR nð Þ= SB + Smax−SBð Þ 1−exp −σ n−1ð Þð Þð Þ ð3Þ
where SR(n) is an increasing function that starts at SB = SR(1), the sur-
vival probability of a solitarily breeding female, and asymptotically
approaches the maximum survival probability Smax. The parameter σ
specifies the magnitude of the survival benefit of a larger group:
higher values of σ mean that survival increases more strongly as group
size increases. We refer to SB as the (species-specific) baseline survival
probability (in most simulations SB = 0.8). Smax is set to 0.95 in all sim-
ulations (Table 1).
2.2.4 | Takeovers
The probability that a resident female is challenged by k floaters is
determined by a Poisson distribution with mean λ = ε nF, where ε is
the “speed” with which floaters discover home ranges, and nF is the
number of female floaters in the population (an emergent parameter
that changes as the behavioral reaction norms evolve). The k floaters
are drawn at random from the floater pool and challenge the female
sequentially (i.e., one at a time). We model the probability t(n) that any
attempt of a floater to take over a home range defended by n group
members is successful using the following function:
t nð Þ= t0exp −τ n−1ð Þð Þ, ð4Þ
where t0 is the (baseline) takeover probability of a home range def-
ended by a lone resident. The parameter τ specifies how strongly the




m Number of home ranges 1,000
n Female group size
nF, nM Number of female floaters, number
of male floaters
R Female rank NA
SR(n) Resident survival (male and female)
SB, SM Baseline survival of resident
females and males, respectively
0.8
SF Floater survival 0.6
Smax Species-specific maximum survival
probability
0.95
σ Survival benefit of group-living 0
F(n,R) Fecundity of a rank R female in a
group of size n
F0 Baseline fecundity 1
φ Effect of within-group scramble
competition
0.1
δ Effect of within-group contest
competition
0.3
t(n) Probability that a group of size n is
taken over by a floater
t0 Baseline takeover probability (per
floater encounter)
0.05
τ Communal resource defense
benefit
0
ε “Efficiency” of floaters to discover
home range
0.005
x(n) Propensity of juvenile female to
stay on natal home range
β 0, β1 Intercept and slope of behavioral
reaction norm for x(n)
5, 0
y(n) Propensity of resident female to
accept juvenile on home range
α 0, α1 Intercept and slope of behavioral
reaction norm for y(n)
5, 0
μ Mutation probability 0.01
Note: Parameters in boldface are evolving parameters, parameters in italics
emerge from the dynamics of the population as the behavioral reaction
norms (dispersal strategies) evolve.
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takeover probability depends on group size, with higher values of τ
indicating that the takeover probability decreases more strongly as
group size increases. After a successful takeover, all former resident
females get evicted and become floaters, whereas the successful
floater establishes itself as a resident.
Inheritance
The parameters α0, α1, β0, and β1 determining the behavioral reaction
norms of juvenile and resident females are heritable, subject to rare
mutation and can, hence, evolve. To be specific, we consider variation
at four diploid loci, each corresponding to one of the four parameters.
Each locus can harbor a broad spectrum of alleles ranging from very
negative to very positive values. The two alleles at a (diploid) locus
determine the reaction norm parameter in an additive manner (e.g.,
α0 = mean[α01, α02]). When offspring are produced, they inherit one
allele per locus from their mother and one from their father. Alleles
are inherited randomly and independently from alleles at other loci.
With a small probability μ (usually 0.01), a mutation occurs. In such a
case, the allelic value of the parent is modified by a small random
number drawn from a Cauchy-distribution with center 0 and width
0.1. At the start of our simulations, α0 = β0 = 5, and α1 = β1 = 0. This
setting renders the behavioral reaction norms insensitive to group
size, and x(n) = y(n) ≈ 0 (Equations 2a and 2b), corresponding to our
initial condition, in which social philopatry has not yet evolved.
Relatedness
Given that in our model the most dominant female controls group-
membership, the relatedness of all other females to the most domi-
nant female is more informative than the average relatedness among
all females in a group. We determined the degree of relatedness to
the most dominant female by first calculating the linear regression of
the allelic values of the above gene loci of each female with rank
R > 1 on the corresponding allelic values of the female with rank R = 1
(Gardner, West, & Wild, 2011; Michod & Hamilton, 1980; see also
Quinones, van Doorn, Pen, Weissing, & Taborsky, 2016) and by sub-
sequently averaging the regression coefficients.
3 | RESULTS
3.1 | No benefits of group-living
We first consider the case σ = 0 and τ = 0, which implies that living in
a larger group neither provides survival benefits (i.e., no protection
against predators) nor yields a higher degree of protection against
takeovers (i.e., no advantage of communal defense). Figure 1 shows
the simulation outcome for the parameter setting φ = 0.1 and δ = 0.3,
corresponding to a 11 and 35% decline in reproductive success of the
dominant and second-ranking female, respectively, compared to the
reproductive success of a solitary female. Hence, there are substantial
costs of group-living (caused by within-group resource competition),
while there are no direct benefits. Yet group-living evolves quite rap-
idly, and mean female group size stabilizes at about 1.8 females per
home range (Figure 1a). Group-living can thus evolve in the absence
of benefits, but groups remain fairly small (Figure 1b).
Figure 1c reveals that the upper group size limit is not determined
by a daughter's reluctance to stay in the natal home range, but by the
mother's reluctance to tolerate further offspring if groups become too
large. This figure shows the evolved behavioral reaction norms relat-
ing a daughter's propensity to stay in the natal home range (dashed
line), and a resident female's propensity to tolerate a new group mem-
ber (solid line) to group size. For all group sizes, the daughters' pro-
pensity to stay evolves to the maximum value 1. In other words,
daughters are selected to remain philopatric irrespective of group size.
By contrast, the residents' evolved reaction norm is highly sensitive to
group size: resident females are tolerant toward their daughters as
long as group size is low, but they tend to evict daughters as groups
grow larger.
It is easy to understand why daughters evolve the tendency to
stay in the natal home range despite significant costs of group-living.
The reason is that the habitat becomes quickly saturated: if most
home ranges are already occupied and a floater's prospects of finding
a vacant home range are low, staying in the natal home range is the
more favorable option for daughters. But why are resident females
willing to tolerate additional group-members (at small group sizes)
despite of the increased costs of within-group competition? The rea-
son is that any new group-member is a relative of an already
established female, and if those relatives' prospects of successful dis-
persal are low, residents are selected to allow them to reproduce on
the natal home range. Even in the absence of direct benefits, there-
fore, primate sociality can evolve as a consequence of kin selection as
long as the direct fitness costs of residents are compensated by the
indirect fitness benefits of allowing their relatives to reproduce.
These conclusions are in line with the findings of earlier models
for the evolution of philopatry and group-living in kin-structured
populations (Giraldeau & Caraco, 1993; Higashi & Yamamura, 1993).
In line with intuitive expectation, these models predict that evolved
group sizes should be positively related with relatedness. We can
check this prediction by comparing the male-residency scenario
(where males are permanently associated with the females in a group)
with the roaming-male scenario (where females mate at random, and
independently of their group members, with solitary floating males).
As expected, female relatedness is higher in the male-residency sce-
nario, because females are usually full-sisters rather than half-sisters,
and as a consequence, the evolved group size is also larger in the
male-residency scenario (Figure 2, online Appendix A). Moreover, in
the male residency scenario, increased survival (i.e., longer tenure) of
the resident male leads to increased relatedness among females and
the evolution of larger groups (Figure 2). Notice, however, that in the
male residency scenario, we ignored possible feeding competition
with the resident male. Evolved female group sizes are presumably
lower if females also compete with the male over resources.
More generally, we found that even severe within-group compe-
tition does not favor voluntary dispersal of juvenile females,
irrespective of whether competition is of the contest or scramble type
(online Appendix B: Figures A2–A4). In almost all cases considered,
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group formation is determined by the resident's evolved degree of tol-
erance. This tolerance collapses to zero whenever the residents' inclu-
sive fitness benefits are too small to compensate the direct fitness
costs associated with living in a larger group.
3.2 | Group-living provides benefits
Figure 3 illustrates how the evolution of group-living is affected when
larger groups provide direct benefits in terms of survival (sur), a higher
probability of successful defense against home range takeovers (def)
or both. When group-living improves resident survival (e.g., as a result
of enhanced predator protection), the average group size increases
from 1.8 females (in the absence of direct benefits) to 2.6 females
(Figure 3a,b). The reason is that resident females evolve a higher toler-
ance toward juvenile females, despite the associated increase in
within-group competition. The group size at which juvenile females
are evicted increases (Figure 3c), leading to group formation under
otherwise more adverse conditions (stronger within-group competi-
tion, online Appendix B: Figures A5–A7). Our model thus shows that
increased survival leads to the evolution of larger groups. Assuming
that increased survival results from better protection against preda-
tors, this result supports the traditional view (Alexander, 1974;
Terborgh & Janson, 1986; van Schaik, 1983) and is in line with empiri-
cal studies (Hill & Lee, 1998; Nunn & van Schaik, 2000; van Schaik &
van Noordwijk, 1985): protection from predators can promote the
evolution of group-living.
However, our simulations also support Wrangham's suggestion
that communal resource defense selects for group-living
(Wrangham, 1980). Adding communal defense to the model without
direct benefits leads to an increase in mean female group size, from
1.8 females (if group-living provides no benefits) to 2.9 females
(Figure 3a,d). This result shows that communal resource defense can
be a second important driver of primate sociality under a wide range
of parameter combinations (online Appendix B: Figures A8–A10,
online Appendix C).
Figure 3 also illustrates that predator avoidance and communal
resource defense, when acting in concert, mutually reinforce each
other. Each benefit alone does generally not lead to the evolution of
sizable groups, but if both benefits act together substantially larger
groups evolve (Figure 3a,g). The reason for this synergism is that both
benefits of group-living interact in decreasing the prospects of float-
ing females to ever attain a breeding position: if sociality enhances
survival, group sizes remain large due to low mortality, and if large
groups can effectively prevent takeovers, floaters have a difficult time
to ever obtain a home range for breeding. As a consequence, the
number of floaters in the population, that is, the intensity of habitat
saturation, strongly increases (Figure 3f).
The evolved reaction norms (Figure 3c,e,h) reveal that, as in the
scenario where group-living does not provide benefits, group forma-
tion is determined by the residents' tolerance threshold rather than by
the daughters' dispersal threshold. The daughters' evolved reaction
norm remains insensitive to group size while residents adjust their
level of tolerance to the size of the group (Figure 3c,e,h). In other
words, group size is generally not limited by the voluntary dispersal of
females, but by the fact that potential new group members get
evicted by established residents (for details and exceptions see online
Appendix B).
3.3 | Effect of demographic parameters on group-
living
Figure 4 illustrates the effect of resident mortality on group-living. It
turns out that this effect is marginal if group-living does not provide
benefits, or if it reduces mortality: In both cases, in the scenario with
higher baseline survival, marginally smaller groups evolve. By contrast,
higher baseline survival has a strong positive effect on the evolved
group sizes if groups benefit from communal defense. The reason is
that, if home ranges are defended communally, low resident mortality
greatly declines a floater's chances to acquire an own home range,
since fewer home ranges drop to a size where a takeover is feasible.
(a) (b)
F IGURE 2 Female relatedness
(a) and group size (b) in the male
residency model and in the roaming
male model if group living provides
no benefits. Both panels show means
(dots) ± SD (whiskers) calculated over
20 simulations for scenarios with low
(SM = 0.8) and high (SM = 0.95) male
survival. All other parameters are as
in Figure 1
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As shown in online Appendix C (Figure A14), similar interactions
between demographic parameters and our proposed benefits of sociality
are observed for variation in fecundity (F0, e.g., variation in inter-birth inter-
vals) and floater mortality (SF). For example, high dispersal related mortality
(low SF) favors the evolution of group-living, but only if group living
improves resident survival (or provides no benefits). By contrast, dispersal
related mortality has no effect on the evolution of sociality in species
where communal resource defense is the major benefit of group-living. The
reason is that, if home ranges are defended communally, the only option
for floaters is to wait for a home range to become vacant (or to drop to a
low number of defending females). In this situation, high mortality
decreases an individual floater's fitness, but it also affects other floaters,
and in this way, decreases competition for the few vacancies arising. These
effects cancel each other, a result consistent with previous models of social
evolution (Kokko & Lundberg, 2001; Pen & Weissing, 2000; Port,









F IGURE 3 The evolution of primate sociality under various benefits of group living. (a) Female group size in case of no benefits (no), benefits
in terms of improved survival (sur), benefits in terms of resource defense (def), and benefits in terms of survival and group defense (both). Bars
show mean ± SD (error bars) evolved group size in the final generation over 20 simulations per scenario. Panel (f) depicts the number of female
floaters in the population at the end of time step 4 of our simulations, that is, after takeovers occurred. As in panel (a), bars show mean ± SD
(error bars) number of female floaters in the final generation over 20 simulations per scenario (no, sur, def, both). Analogously to Figure 1b,c for
the case of no benefits, the remaining panels depict the distribution of female group sizes (middle column) and the evolved behavioral reaction
norms of dominant females and daughters (right column) in the final generation of a representative simulation for each benefit scenario: (b, c)
survival benefits; (d, e) defense benefits; (g, h) both benefits. Parameters: σ = 1, τ = 0 in panels (b, c); σ = 0, τ = 1 in panels (d, e); σ = 1, τ = 1 in
panels (g, h). All other parameters as in Figure 1
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4 | DISCUSSION
We developed an individual-based evolutionary model to shed new light
on an old question: why are most primates living in groups? By means of
extensive and replicated simulations, we arrived at several general conclu-
sions. First, we showed that living in small groups can evolve due to kin
selection, even in the absence of direct benefits of group-living. Second,
we showed that communal defense of resources against outsiders provides
a stronger selective advantage of group-living in primates than previously
thought. Third, our model indicates that habitat saturation is an important
driver of female social philopatry, whereas contrasts in within-group
resource competition have a comparatively weak effect on female dispersal
patterns. Finally, our model indicates that variation in demographic parame-
ters (e.g., life-history) can have profound effects on the evolution of social-
ity, and that the direction of these effects depends on the underlying
benefits of group-living. We will discuss each of these conclusions in more
detail below. After that, we will discuss limitations of our model, highlight
avenues for future research, and compare our model to theoretical models
developed outside the field of primatology.
4.1 | Kin selection
Theoretical models have long suggested that kin selection should
facilitate the evolution of group-formation (Cant & Johnstone, 2009;
Giraldeau & Caraco, 1993; Higashi & Yamamura, 1993). Moreover,
kin selection has been shown to be a driving force behind the evolu-
tion of animal societies with high degrees of reproductive altruism
(eusociality (Hughes, Oldroyd, Beekman, & Ratnieks, 2008), coopera-
tive breeding (Cornwallis, West, Davis, & Griffin, 2010; Lukas &
Clutton-Brock, 2012b)). It is therefore not surprising to find that kin
selection promotes the evolution of primate sociality as well. Most
primates are not cooperative breeders, but our model considers a
form of reproductive altruism as well: if residents allow daughters to
remain in their own home range, they suffer direct fitness costs as
their personal reproductive success declines. Even in the absence of
direct benefits, these fitness costs can be compensated by the inclu-
sive fitness benefits of allowing their relatives to reproduce in their
natal home range. These inclusive fitness benefits arise, because
sharing their home range yields higher inclusive fitness for residents
than forcing their relatives to disperse into a saturated habitat. It is
interesting to note that Richard Wrangham (1980) already predicted
this mechanism more than 30 years ago: “individuals should cooper-
ate with the closest available kin; by doing so they avoid excluding
them from the food patch” [p.268]. Yet, unfortunately, the role of
kin selection in the evolution of group formation has remained
obscure in later developments of the SEM, and the inclusive fitness
consequences of dispersal have generally been neglected. For exam-
ple, the SEM predicts that, if within-group competition is predomi-
nantly of the scramble type, females may often disperse (Sterck
et al., 1997; van Schaik, 1989). However, the model remains vague
about where these females should go, or why they should prefer to
live with non-relatives rather than with relatives on the natal home
range.
4.2 | Predation and communal resource defense
Our model supports the traditional notion that predator avoidance
can select for group-living in primates (Alexander, 1974; Terborgh &
Janson, 1986; van Schaik, 1983). However, it also suggests that, if
within-group competition constrains group augmentation, predator
avoidance alone does rarely lead to the evolution of sizable groups.
Our model rather provides new credence to Wrangham's classic idea
that communal resource defense can be a (second) driver of group-
living in primates (Wrangham, 1980). If both benefits act together,
they reinforce each other and strongly promote the evolution of pri-
mate sociality.
This result seems to be in contrast to many field studies, based on
which communal resource defense was rejected as an explanation for
the evolution of group-living in primates (reviewed in Janson, 1988;
Jolly et al., 2002; Schülke & Ostner, 2012; Terborgh & Janson, 1986;
van Schaik, 1983; van Schaik, 1989). How can we explain this differ-
ence? A prediction usually derived from Wrangham's theory is that, if
communal resource defense provides a selective advantage of group-
living in primates, female fecundity should increase with increasing
group size. Yet the observed relationship is in the opposite direction in
most species (e.g., Jolly et al., 2002; Kappeler & Fichtel, 2012; Som-
mer & Rajpurohit, 1989; van Noordwijk & van Schaik, 1999; van
Schaik, 1983). Our model shows, however, that the above prediction is
not necessarily correct. In fact, female fecundity declines in our model
F IGURE 4 Effect of demography on the evolution of primate
sociality. Evolved female group sizes (mean ± SD, calculated as in
Figure 3) in three benefit scenarios for two values of baseline survival
(SB = 0.8, SB = 0.9). All other parameters as in Figure 1
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by assumption, and yet communal resource defense selects for the evo-
lution of group-living. In other words, while within-group resource com-
petition certainly constitutes an important cost of group-living,
demonstrating these costs does not mean that communal resource
defense can be excluded as a selective advantage of primate sociality.
Wrangham's theory, therefore, has been rejected based on the wrong
prediction. But does that mean that Wrangham was right? Wrangham was
certainly right to suggest that communal resource defense can be a strong
selective advantage of group-living. Yet the scenario he had in mind when
he developed his verbal model differs from the scenario addressed by our
model. Wrangham (1980) considered communal defense of feeding pat-
ches (e.g., fruit trees), whereas our model considers communal defense of
home-ranges. In most contemporary group-living primates, competition
between groups occurs over feeding patches (i.e., the scenario envisaged
by Wrangham), but groups rarely supplant each other from whole home
ranges or territories. However, this was presumably different at the dawn
of primate sociality (i.e., the scenario addressed by our model). The ances-
tral type of social organization in primates (and other mammals) was likely a
solitary forager (Kappeler, 2014; Lukas & Clutton-Brock, 2013; Shultz
et al., 2011), where females lived on individual home ranges, presumably
showing varying degrees of association withmales (Kappeler, 2014; Lukas &
Clutton-Brock, 2013), a type of social organization still observed in many
contemporary prosimians (Kappeler, 2012). Territorial conflict, including
home range takeovers, commonly occurs in species living on individual
home ranges (Fernandez-Duque & Huck, 2013; Mosser, Kosmala, &
Packer, 2015; Piper, Tischler, & Klich, 2000). We believe, therefore, that
our population structure better than Wrangham's scenario reflects ances-
tral primate conditions. It is important to note, however, that resource com-
petition, as we define it, cannot necessarily be equated with the types of
between-group competition observed in contemporary, group-living pri-
mates. Whether between-group competition helps to maintain female soci-
ality in contemporary primates is beyond the scope of our model and
should be addressed by future theory.
4.3 | Habitat saturation and within-group resource
competition
According to the SEM, contrasts in resource competition within
groups most strongly predict contrasts in female dispersal patterns,
that is, whether females habitually disperse or remain philopatric. A
common argument is that, where within-group contest competition is
weak (because food is evenly distributed and not monopolizable), such
that females do not strongly benefit from kin support, female dispersal
should be common (Sterck et al., 1997; van Schaik, 1989). This link
between within-group contest competition and female dispersal is
among the most strongly disputed predictions of the SEM (Clutton-
Brock & Janson, 2012; Koenig & Borries, 2009; Schülke &
Ostner, 2012; Thierry, 2008), mainly because it has proven difficult to
quantify within-group resource competition empirically (Koenig &
Borries, 2009; Snaith & Chapman, 2007). Our model suggests that
such a link is likely not to be expected from a theoretical point of
view: owing to high levels of habitat saturation, females are usually
favored to remain on the natal home range. Compared to the strong
effect of habitat saturation, the type (scramble vs. contest) and inten-
sity of within-group competition is of marginal importance and does
not exercise strong selection on voluntary dispersal.
Given the strong effect of habitat saturation predicted by our
model, one might ask how strongly saturated the habitat is in which
primates live? In this context, it is important to distinguish the concept
of habitat saturation from the concept of carrying capacity. While car-
rying capacity is usually interpreted as the number of individuals a
habitat can support, a habitat is considered saturated if all suitable
home ranges are occupied, and a “surplus” of individuals is produced,
which, in solitary species, lives as non-territorial floaters (Kokko &
Lundberg, 2001; in social species, “surplus” individual might join exis-
ting social groups). It is reasonable to assume that most primates live
in saturated habitats; otherwise, primate populations would not be
able to maintain themselves. However, the strength of selection for
social philopatry is not determined by the existence of habitat satura-
tion per se, but by the intensity of habitat saturation (Figure 3a,f, see
also Kokko & Lundberg, 2001). This intensity often varies as a result
of contrasts in demographic parameters (e.g., mortality reduces habi-
tat saturation, see demography, below).
Both our model and the SEM suggest that there are conditions
under which females leave their natal group, but the underlying mech-
anisms are different: The SEM predicts that natal females disperse
voluntarily (Koenig & Borries, 2002; Sterck et al., 1997; van
Schaik, 1989), whereas our model predicts that females usually leave
their natal group because they get evicted. In contrast to these (ver-
bal) models, therefore, our model does not predict different dispersal
patterns under different types of within-group competition
(i.e., scramble, contest). Our model only predicts that increased
within-group competition (particularly scramble competition) leads to
elevated rates of evictions (online Appendix B). In this respect, our
model resembles an alternative model of primate social evolution pro-
posed by Isbell (Isbell, 2004). Like our model, Isbell's model suggests
that female social philopatry is a consequence of poor dispersal pros-
pects. Moreover, if females leave their natal group, both our model
and Isbell's model predict that they usually get evicted. A difference
between Isbell's model and our model is that, according to Isbell,
social philopatry does not evolve if resident reproductively active
females suffer reproductive costs. By contrast, our model indicates
that reproductive costs of the dominant female can be compensated
by her inclusive fitness benefits of sharing their home range with
relatives.
4.4 | Demography
Theoreticians have long recognized that demography and life-history
can have profound effects on the evolution of sociality and altruism
(Kokko & Lundberg, 2001; Lehmann & Rousset, 2010; Pen &
Weissing, 2000; Port et al., 2011), and some predictions of theoretical
models have been supported in comparative analyses (Arnold &
Owens, 1998; Lukas & Clutton-Brock, 2012a). Like previous models,
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our results suggest that demographic parameters play a crucial role in
the evolution of (primate) sociality, but our results also indicate that
whether the effect of demographic parameters is positive or negative
depends on the assumed benefit of group-living. If group-living
improves communal resource defense, our model predicts that low
resident mortality generally strengthens selection for group-living
(owing to its effect on habitat saturation), resulting in the evolution of
larger groups. If we take body size as a proxy for baseline mortality,
this prediction appears to be well supported, as large-bodied primates
tend to live in larger groups (Clutton-Brock & Harvey, 1977; Janson &
Goldsmith, 1995). By contrast, the positive relationship between body
size and group size could not easily be explained by the predation
avoidance hypothesis, and prompted extensions and alterations of the
SEM (Janson & Goldsmith, 1995).
4.5 | Limitations of the model and avenues for
future research
The aim of this study was to quantify the selective pressures leading
to the evolution of female sociality. To do so, we have started from a
type of social organization where females are initially living solitarily
(Lukas & Clutton-Brock, 2012b). Based on this scenario, we have
then examined the conditions under which females evolved to be
social. We examined two alternative scenarios: One in which females
are not associated with a male, and one in which they are associated
with a single male, rendering the starting-point in our model pair-liv-
ing. We have shown that female social philopatry can evolve under
both scenarios. However, we cannot answer the question whether
(in the real world) female sociality directly evolved from solitary
females to group-living females (Shultz et al., 2011), or whether it
first progressed from solitary females to pair-living and then to
groups consisting of multiple females (Kappeler & Pozzi, 2019;
Lukas & Clutton-Brock, 2013). While no theoretical model will be
able to provide a definite answer to this question, an extension of
our model could be used to check the plausibility of alternative sce-
narios proposed by phylogenetic reconstructions (Kappeler &
Pozzi, 2019; Lukas & Clutton-Brock, 2013; Shultz et al., 2011). In
addition to female strategies, such a model would have to include
evolvable male strategies, and would have to examine at what point
in evolution males would be favored to permanently associate with
(groups of) females.
Moreover, we have assumed that males inevitably disperse. We
have thus excluded the possibility that males rather than females evo-
lve to be philopatric, and we can consequently not explain why, in
some primate species, males rather than females are the more
philopatric sex. The evolutionary causes of sex-biased dispersal have
been disputed for decades and are currently still not resolved
(Clutton-Brock & Lukas, 2012; Greenwood, 1980; Lawson-Handley &
Perrin, 2007). Yet in light of our current understanding of sex-biased
dispersal, particularly the involvement of local mate competition
(Perrin & Mazalov, 1999), we consider it highly unlikely that male
rather than female philopatry evolved as a first step from an initially
solitary social organization. We rather suggest that male philopatry
(and female dispersal) evolved as a derived trait after the transition to
sociality had occurred, and that it evolved in species where male ten-
ure length exceeds female age at first reproduction, such that females
face the risk of mating with their fathers (Lukas & Clutton-Brock,-
2011). Future research could extend our model to test this sugges-
tion. Such an extended model, too, would have to include evolvable
male strategies, and also fitness costs due to inbreeding depression.
We have assumed that female primates acquire home ranges
either by filling empty home ranges or by displacing other females
from their home ranges. How realistic is this assumption? Our model
suggests that once groups have grown sufficiently large, takeovers no
longer occur, so we have to seek evidence in solitary or pair-living
species. Unfortunately, home range takeovers (if they occur) are rare
events that are difficult to observe in solitary primates (almost all of
which are nocturnal). Yet displacements of females by floaters have
been reported in at least two pair-living primates (Huck & Fernandez-
Duque, 2012; Overdorff & Tecot, 2007), and territorial conflicts
among females, including takeovers, have also been observed in other
vertebrates (Freed, 1986; Gour et al., 2013; Piper, Walcott, Mager, &
Spilker, 2008). Lastly, takeovers are very common among males, both
in primates and in other vertebrates (Arnold, 1990; Packer &
Pusey, 1982; Piper et al., 2008; Port, Johnstone, & Kappeler, 2010;
Snyder-Mackler, Alberts, & Bergman, 2012). We thus believe that this
form of home range acquisition is a realistic assumption for the pre-
sumed ancestral primate social organization our model focuses on.
However, there are at least two possible alternative dispersal
options, which we have omitted in this model: First, females may dis-
perse to join non-relatives on a different home range. This form of dis-
persal has been addressed in detail in previous models (Port
et al., 2011; Port et al., 2017; Port & Johnstone, 2013), but it is pre-
sumably less relevant in the present model. If females are given the
option to join relatives on the natal home range, or non-relatives on a
distant home range, they should usually prefer relatives over non-rela-
tives, unless factors such as inbreeding avoidance (Lukas & Clutton-
Brock, 2011) or local resource competition (Isbell, 2004; Perrin &
Mazalov, 2000; West, Pen, & Griffin, 2002) constrain group formation
among relatives. Second, females may try to acquire home ranges by
“squeezing” themselves into the boundaries of neighboring home
ranges (López-Sepulcre & Kokko, 2005). We leave the modeling of
these alternative dispersal scenarios to future models, since they
require a considerable extension of our model. The option of joining
non-natal groups requires a substantial extension of the set of strate-
gies (e.g., a condition-dependent floater strategy to join an already
established group), while dispersal via territory-budding requires a
spatially explicit model, that is, a model that explicitly incorporates the
spatial configuration of home ranges.
4.6 | Comparison with other models
Our model is not the first quantitative model that addresses the evo-
lution of social philopatry, and previous models for the evolution of
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group size, natal philopatry, or cooperative breeding obtained partially
similar results. For example, optimal group-size models (Giraldeau &
Caraco, 1993; Higashi & Yamamura, 1993) examined costs and inclu-
sive fitness benefits of social living in relation to group size. Similar to
our model, these models show that, if group-membership is deter-
mined by established residents, genetic relatedness to potential
joiners facilitates group formation and leads to the evolution of larger
groups. However, these models use rather abstract fitness functions
based on the average fitness of group members. Later models derive
more specific fitness expressions dependent on individual state
(e.g., dominant, subordinate) and consider how aspects of social living
affect specific fitness components such as survival or fecundity
(Kokko & Johnstone, 1999; Kokko, Johnstone, & Clutton-Brock, 2001)
(Kokko & Lundberg, 2001; Pen & Weissing, 2000). Yet these models
do either not consider possible feedbacks between ecological and
evolutionary dynamics, or if they do, are restricted to associations of
only two individuals.
Our model combines aspects of all aforementioned models into a
single framework, and adds several novel features: First, we allow for
the evolution of condition-dependent dispersal strategies (our dis-
persal strategies are conditional on group size). Second, we incorpo-
rated elements of primate socioecology by including and examining
different types and strengths of within-group competition. Lastly, we
incorporated the possibility of home range takeovers (Port
et al., 2011; Port et al., 2017) as a home range acquisition rule for
floaters that had been neglected in models of social philopatry.
These significant extensions compared to previous models have
become possible because we use an individual-based simulation
approach rather than an analytical (or numerical) approach based on
fitness functions. Both approaches have advantages and disadvan-
tages. Analytical results can ideally be represented in the form of intu-
itively plausible equations or inequalities (like Hamilton's rule), which
clearly reveal what outcome is to be expected under a given set of
parameters. In contrast, individual-based simulations are stochastic
and therefore necessitate extensive sets of replicate simulations for
obtaining an often limited overview of how the model outcome is
related to the underlying parameters. On the positive side, simulation
models can be set up in a much more flexible and realistic manner,
since these models are not restricted by considerations of analytical
tractability. As a consequence, they can potentially deal with large
sets of strategies (there are already four evolving parameters in our
model) and complex population structures. This is particularly impor-
tant for organisms such as primates that live in highly derived and
complex social systems.
4.7 | Testing the model
Are there any predictions of our model that can be tested using
empirical data of primates? Our model predicts that demographic
parameters (mortality, fecundity) affect the evolution of group
size. It might thus be tempting to test these predictions at a com-
parative level across primates. However, our model focuses on a
scenario that likely reflects ancestral primate conditions, and in
which several presumably derived traits, such as female dispersal
between groups are not considered (see limitations of our model).
Testing our model in species exhibiting such traits would thus not
be appropriate. Moreover, our model has shown that several other
parameters affect the evolution of group size, perhaps most impor-
tantly, within-group scramble competition. As long as we cannot
(also) measure these parameters, they will represent strong con-
founders that will be difficult to control in any comparative test of
our model. Thus, rather than testing our model at a comparative
level, it might be more suitable to parameterize our model with
field data of a single or few species. For example, we envisage, that
the quantities fecundity (F(n,R), Equation 1), survival probability of
residents (SR(n), Equation 3), and takeover probability (t(n), Equa-
tion 4) can be estimated directly from field data (see, e.g., Port
et al., 2012). Such an approach could then test whether our model
correctly predicts the social organization (e.g., group size, kin
structure) of the target species.
But is it really necessary to test our model? Providing testable
predictions is not the sole (and often not even the most important)
purpose of a model (Levins, 1966). By considering alternative scenar-
ios, models can provide us with useful insights about the real world
that we would likely not have gained with purely verbal reasoning.
Our model has drawn our attention to possible mechanisms and selec-
tive pressures of primate social evolution (e.g., inclusive fitness, habi-
tat saturation, demography) that six decades of primate socioecology
have largely neglected. At the same time, our model suggests that fac-
tors which have long been thought to be key for the evolution of pri-
mate sociality, such as contrasts in within-group resource
competition, are likely not as important as previously thought. Even
without empirical testing, therefore, our model should provide fresh
impetus to the field of primate socioecology, and hopefully also, a
new direction for future research.
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